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Abstract 
Dealing with large quantities of inflammable and explosive materials, usually at high-pressure 
high-temperature conditions, makes process plants very vulnerable to cascading effects 
compared with other infrastructures. The combination of the extremely low frequency of 
cascading effects and the high complexity and interdependencies of process plants makes risk 
assessment and vulnerability analysis of process plants very challenging in the context of such 
events. In the present study, cascading effects were represented as a directed graph; accordingly, 
the efficacy of a set of graph metrics and measurements was examined in both unit and plant-
wide vulnerability analysis of process plants. We demonstrated that vertex-level closeness and 
betweenness can be used in the unit vulnerability analysis of process plants for the identification 
of critical units within a process plant. Furthermore, the graph-level closeness metric can be used 
in the plant-wide vulnerability analysis for the identification of the most vulnerable plant layout 
with respect to the escalation of cascading effects. Furthermore, the results from the application 
of the graph metrics have been verified using a Bayesian network methodology.  
Keywords: Cascading effect; Process plant; Vulnerability analysis; Graph metrics; Bayesian 
network. 
1. Introduction 
Process plants are normally characterized by a number of dependent and interlinked components 
which contain, carry, or process hazardous (e.g., inflammable, explosive, toxic) materials usually 
in high-temperature high-pressure conditions. As a result, an otherwise ordinary accident or 
undesired event which could be tolerated or controlled in other industrial plants has the potential 
of turning into a catastrophe within a few hours due to the possibility of triggering a cascading 
effect. Cascading effects (also known as domino effects or chains of accidents) in the process 
industry are low-frequency high-consequence chains of accidents. In case of a cascading effect, a 
primary accident (e.g., a fire) in a primary unit (e.g., a storage tank) propagates to neighboring 
units and triggers secondary accidents in the vicinity of the primary unit and so forth. To 
consider it a cascading effect, the overall consequences of such a sequence of accidents should 
be higher than those of the primary event [1]. Usually, the final outcome of a cascading effect is 
several orders of magnitude more severe than that of the primary accident. 

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The propagation of the primary accident is usually carried out by means of escalation vectors 
such as fire impingement, fire engulfment or heat radiation in the case of fires, and overpressure 
wave or projectile fragments in the case of explosions. These escalation vectors help the primary 
accident to propagate by causing damage (loss of containment or loss of physical integrity) to 
adjacent units (target units). The probability of escalation, however, depends on a variety of 
factors such as the type of the primary accident and the intensity of escalation vectors, the 
distance between the primary unit and the target units, the vulnerability of the target units, and 
the type and inventory of chemical substances involved [2].  
In spite of their extremely low frequency, the possibility of cascading effects should not be 
ignored in safety risk assessment and vulnerability analysis of process plants. In fact, high 
complexity and interdependencies within process plants make them increasingly vulnerable to 
cascading effects. For instance, LPG1-induced cascading effects in Mexico City in November 
1984 left 650 deaths and 6500 injuries and destructed three process plants. Most recently, in 
December 2005, a series of fires and explosions in an oil storage plant in the Buncefield 
Complex, in the United Kingdom, led to the largest fire in peacetime Europe, leaving 43 injuries 
and causing huge devastation in the area [3]. Cascading effects have long been recognized in 
process plants and chemical infrastructures [4-7], and have been studied in risk assessment and 
management of process plants over the past decade [8-21].  
In the context of safety risk assessment and management of critical infrastructures, however, 
other factors such as vulnerability, robustness, and resilience should also be taken into account 
[16,22,23]. Johansson et al. [23] use the term vulnerability “as the inability of a system to 
withstand strains and the effects of failures”. In the present study, however, vulnerability is 
defined as the capability of a process plant to foster either the onset or the escalation of potential 
cascading effects. On the contrary, robustness can be defined as the ability of the process plant to 
hamper the escalation of cascading effects. As a result, vulnerability and robustness can be 
regarded as two complementary terms in this context. While the aim of traditional risk analysis is 
to identify hazardous events, their likelihood and potential consequences, the aim of vulnerability 
analysis is to explore the system weaknesses by identifying those critical components whose 
failure can adversely affect the performance of the system. Compared with risk analysis, in 
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vulnerability analysis, however, the failure probabilities are less important and more emphasis is 
given to the extent and severity of the consequences [24]. Furthermore, vulnerability analysis is 
usually performed using deterministic or analytical techniques – as opposed to probabilistic 
methods used in risk analysis – to seek the impact of accidental or intentional failures on the 
performance of a system [16,22].  
Vulnerability analysis can be considered from two perspectives: (i) plant vulnerability and (ii) 
unit vulnerability. Plant vulnerability can be interpreted as an inherent characteristic of a process 
plant to measure how far and to what extent the adverse effects of a primary accident can 
propagate through the plant. This interpretation of vulnerability can be beneficial when deciding 
among alternative layouts in the early design stage of process plants so that the most robust 
layout could be selected. Unit vulnerability analysis, however, can be carried out to identify 
critical units within a process plant. This interpretation of vulnerability can be employed to 
allocate proactive countermeasures to the weak points and critical units so that the onset of 
cascading effects can be prevented or their escalation can be hampered. Generally speaking, in a 
chain of accidents which starts from unit , traverses unit , and terminates at unit  (i.e., 
     ), , , and  are known as source, intermediate, and sink or terminal units, 
respectively [16]. In a process plant, a critical component can be deemed as either (i) a source 
unit whose failure would cause large adverse consequences to the plant (critical initiating unit) or 
(ii) an intermediate unit whose failure helps escalate a previously occurred accident through the 
plant to a large extent (critical transmitting unit) or (iii) a unit which turn outs to be the sink unit 
in many potential cascading effects with different sequences of source and intermediate units 
within a process plant (critical terminal unit).  
Compared to well-established methods available in risk analysis of cascading effects, relevant 
work in the field of vulnerability analysis has been very few [16,20,21,25-27]. Cozzani et al. [25] 
introduced a set of domino indices to score and identify critical units within process plants with 
respect to escalation events. Khakzad et al. [20] established a Bayesian network methodology to 
identify the most probable sequence of accidents (i.e., 	
	     ) in a process 
plant. Most recently, Reniers and Audenaert [16] used a network theory to rank most vulnerable 
intermediate and terminal units based on “terminal and propagation vulnerability indices”. 
Similar work has been conducted to determine safety distances and safety inventories [21,26] in 
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order to reduce the vulnerability of process plants subject to cascading effects. Representing a 
process plant by means of nodes (units of the plant) and edges (escalation vectors among the 
units) of a graph in this study, we aim to explore the applicability and efficiency of a set of graph 
metrics to both unit and plant vulnerability analysis of process plants, and chemical 
infrastructures in general, in the context of cascading effects. 
This paper is organized as follows. The basic concepts and escalation mechanism of cascading 
effects within process plants are recapitulated in Section 2. The graph theory metrics used in this 
work are introduced and briefly explained in Section 3. A brief description of Bayesian networks 
and its application to modeling cascading effects [20] is replicated in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
apply graph metrics to vulnerability analysis of hypothetical process plants in order to identify 
most critical initiating and transmitting units within a plant (unit vulnerability analysis) and also 
to rank different plant layouts in terms of vulnerability (plant vulnerability analysis), and then 
compare the results obtained from the application of graph metrics with those from the Bayesian 
network methodology. The main conclusions drawn from this work have been presented in 
Section 6.  
2. Terminology and escalation mechanism of cascading effects  
Cascading effects take place when an accident in a unit (primary unit) propagates to other units 
(secondary units) by means of escalation vectors. Escalation vectors are physical effects such as 
fire impingement, fire engulfment, or heat radiation in the case of a fire, and deflagration 
overpressure or projectile fragments in the case of an explosion. Simple methods for calculation 
of escalation vectors can be found in [28-30]. The probability of escalation, however, depends 
not only on the type and intensity of escalation vectors but also on the inventory of chemicals 
and the vulnerability of target units. Moreover, to determine if a target unit is likely to be 
impacted by an escalation vector, the intensity of the escalation vector at the point of interest 
(i.e., the location of the target unit) should be higher than a corresponding threshold value2. For 
example, for atmospheric vessels (e.g., atmospheric storage tanks) the threshold values for the 
heat radiation and the overpressure have been proposed as      and    , 
respectively [25]. 
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Figure 1 shows the onset of a cascading effect in which a fire (primary accident) in the unit 
(primary unit) is likely to impact the neighboring units  and  but not 	. The reason is the 
intensity of the escalation vectors (here heat radiation) received by  () and  () is 
above the threshold value (i.e.,     ! "   
!
), while that of 	 (#) is 
not (i.e., #  $ ! %   
!
 ). Therefore,  and  could be selected as potential 
secondary units involved in the cascading effect, helping to escalate the cascading effect to the 
first level3. After either  or  is involved in the cascading effect, it can contribute with  to 
impact 	 to escalate the cascading effect to the second level only if the superposition of the 
respective escalation vectors is greater than the corresponding threshold value, which is the case 
for the cascading effect shown in Figure 1 (i.e., # & # & #  $ ! "   
!
). This 
contribution of units (the primary and secondary units) to impact another unit (tertiary unit) is 
known as the synergistic effect [20,21].  
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Among methods available to estimate the escalation probabilities, probit models [8-10] have 
been very popular due to their simplicity and flexibility which facilitate their application to a 
wide variety of accident scenarios, escalation vectors, and target units with different 
vulnerabilities. Using probit models, usually both the type of a unit (e.g., atmospheric or 
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pressurized) and the type of escalation vector the unit receives (e.g., heat radiation or 
overpressure) are taken into consideration to calculate a probit value ) in the form of: 
)   & *+ ,-.          (1) 
where a and b represent probit coefficients determined using experimental data and regression 
methods; . is either the escalation vector (e.g., heat radiation intensity) or relevant parameters 
such as //0 of the secondary unit. Table 1 presents some probit models for vulnerability analysis 
of atmospheric and pressurized units exposed to heat radiation and overpressure [9]. In Table 1, 
) is probit value; //0 is the time to failure of the secondary unit in (s);  is the received heat 
radiation in (1 ⁄ ); 3 is the volume of the secondary unit in ().  
 
Table 1.Probit models for heat radiation [9] 
Type of unit Escalation vector Probit model 
Atmospheric Heat radiation )  +4 5 +$46,-//0
,-//0  5+7,- 5 +86 9  :;3 & <+< 
Pressurized Heat radiation )  +4 5 +$46,-//0
,-//0  5 +<,- & $+$3=+= 
 
Having )  determined (e.g., by using the probit models given in Table 1), the escalation 
probability could be estimated as: 
  >) 5          (2) 
where > is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. For spreadsheet 
applications, however, the escalation probability can alternatively be approximated from the 
following relationship: 
   ? & @:;A@:;A BC0
A@:;A
√ E        (3) 
where 
is the error function. 
3. Graph theory: metrics and measurements  
A mathematical graph is an ordered pair F  3	 G  comprising a set of vertices 3 
HI	 I	 J 	 IKL and a set of edges  G  HB	 B	 J 	 BL. The order of a graph is determined by the 
number of its vertices |3|  - while the size of a graph is the number of its edges |G|  . A 
vertex can simply be represented as a node, and an edge can be drawn as a line, directed or 
undirected, connecting two vertices. In a weighted graph, a set of numerical values can also be 
/
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assigned to either the vertices or edges of the graph. In this case, the weighted graph can be 
presented as F  3	 G	MN	 MO in which MN and MO are weight vectors allocated to vertices and 
edges, respectively.  
In a directed graph, a walk from the vertex I' to I( is a sequence of vertices and edges starting 
from I' and ending in I( when each intermediate vertex can be traversed several times. A path, 
however, is a walk from I'  to I(  where each intermediate vertex is traversed only once. 
Similarly, the geodesic distance betweenI' and I(, denoted by P'(  PI'	 I(, is the length of the 
shortest path from I' to I(. If there is no path between I' and I(, then P'(  Q. A path that starts 
and ends at the same vertex is called a cycle, and a graph that contains at least a cycle is called 
cyclic. Otherwise, the graph is acyclic.  
In graph theory, there have been developed metrics and indices either to identify most important 
(critical) vertices or to rank different graph structures. Accordingly, the relevant metrics in this 
work are divided into two categories: (i) vertex-level metrics and (ii) graph-level metrics. The 
former category is used to identify and rank critical vertices within a graph (i.e., unit 
vulnerability analysis) while the latter category is used to compare different graph structures 
based on their vulnerability (i.e., plant vulnerability analysis). We briefly describe each category 
in the following sections.  
3.1.Vertex metrics 
A variety of metrics have been proposed for graph vertices among which ‘degree’, 
‘betweenness’, and ‘closeness’ measures [31] have been very popular. The degree of a vertex I', 
RI', is simply the number of edges that traverse the vertex. It can be interpreted as the amount 
of information received by a vertex (in-degree) or the amount of information disseminating from 
a vertex through the graph (out-degree).  
RI  PBSI          (4) 
The betweenness of a vertexI', 
I', is defined as the fraction of geodesic distances between 
all pairs of vertices which traverse the vertex of interest. 

I'  ∑
UVWXY
UVW
(	           (5) 
where P(  is the geodesic distance between I(  and I  while P(I'  is the geodesic distance 
between I( and I which passes through the vertex I'. As can be seen from Equation 5, a vertex 
0
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with a high betweenness lies along a large fraction of geodesic distances within the graph so that 
its removal from the graph could cause a large disconnection. 
Closeness of a vertex I' , I', measures how many steps are needed to reach every other 
vertices of the graph fromI'. 
I'  ∑

UXY	XV
(           (6) 
3.2.Graph metrics 
Based on the aforementioned vertex centrality measures, a set of corresponding centrality 
measures can be defined for a graph. In this regard, ‘degree’, ‘betweenness’, and ‘closeness 
centrality’ metrics of a graph can be calculated using Equation 7: 
F  ∑ IZ 5 I'
|N|
'[          (7) 
where F is the graph-level centrality measure; I' is the vertex-level centrality measure; IZ 
is a vertex of the graph for which the centrality measure of interest is maximum. It is worth 
noting that I' and IZ are calculated from Equations 4-6.  
The density  of a graph is the ratio of the number of edges  to the maximum number of 
possible edges KK:

 which occur in a complete graph with n vertices . It is usually used as 
measure of linkedness or sparseness of a graph [22]: 
\ 

KK:
           (8) 
Average node degree   
K
  is a basic measure of the graph connectivity compared to a lattice-
like graph [22]. 
4. Application of Bayesian network to domino effect modeling 
4.1.Bayesian network 
Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) for reasoning under uncertainty [33], 
with a wide variety of applications in risk, safety, and reliability analysis of dependent and 
complex systems [34]. BN takes advantage of a flexible graphical structure to represent the 
(causal) relationships between the components of a system using vertices and edges. The type 
and strength of these relationships are defined using conditional probability tables. BN uniquely 
1
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factorizes the joint probability distribution of a set of random variables ]  H]	 ]	 J 	 ]KL using 
the chain rule and d-separation criteria as the product of the probabilities of each variable 
conditioned on its immediate parents (its direct causes): 
]	 ]	 J 	 ]K  ∏ ]'|_]'
K
'[       (9) 
where _]' is the parent set of ]'. BN uses Bayes’ theorem to conduct belief updating given 
new evidence :  
]|G 
`a	O
`O

`a	O
∑ `a	Ob
         (10) 
More detailed information on BN can be found in [35,36].  
4.2.Cascading effect modeling 
In this work we apply a methodology introduced in [20] to model cascading effects using BN. 
Since the modeling procedure has been explained in detail elsewhere [20], we only recapitulate 
the main steps for the sake of brevity.  
1. Credible units of the process plant are identified based on their hazardous material inventory, 
and presented as the vertices (nodes) of the BN. 
2. After the primary unit was identified, possible accident scenarios are determined considering 
the types of the unit and chemical inventory as well as the physical and operational 
conditions.  
3.  The magnitude of the escalation vectors generated by each accident scenario is quantified at 
neighboring units (target units). 
4. The target units at which the magnitude of escalation vectors are greater than corresponding 
threshold values [25] are identified as secondary units affected by the primary accident.  
5. Edges are drawn from the primary unit to the secondary units. The conditional probabilities 
of the secondary units being damaged by the primary unit can be estimated using probit 
models (see e.g., Table 1 and Equation 2).  
6. Steps 2 to 5 are repeated for the secondary units to identify tertiary units and so forth.  
For the sake of clarification, the conditional probability table of 	 in the BN of Figure 1 has 
been calculated using probit models in Table 1 [9] and Equation 2 (or 3), and presented in Table 
2. It should be noted that the conditional probability of 	 not being affected during the 

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cascading effect, i.e., ]4  c0BA]	 ]	 ]7 , can be readily obtained from Table 2 as 
]4  c0BA]	 ]	 ]7   5 ]4  deCBA]	 ]	 ]7.  
Table 2. Conditional probability of 	 in the BN of Figure 1. 
' ' ' '2%	
%	 %	 %	 /#13-1
%	 %	 4
	 #/3-1$
%	 4
	 %	 #/3-1$
%	 4
	 4
	 1
4
	 %	 %	 #03-1$
4
	 %	 4
	 1
4
	 4
	 %	 1
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	 4
	 4
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5. Vulnerability analysis 
5.1.Unit vulnerability analysis 
In this work, we demonstrate the application of graph metrics to vulnerability analysis of process 
plants through a number of hypothetic fuel storage plants. To examine the applicability of vertex 
metrics in identifying critical units within a process plant, consider a fuel storage plant including 
eight identical atmospheric storage tanks containing benzene (C6H6) as depicted in Figure 2.  
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For illustrative purposes, pool fire and heat radiation have been considered the only accident 
scenario and escalation vector, respectively, for the storage tanks. Considering equal type 
(atmospheric storage tank) and size ( ) for all the tanks, the same chemical contained 
(benzene), and apparently identical operational and environmental conditions, it would not be 
straightforward to identify the most critical initiating unit which could be used as the primary 
unit in the cascading effect modeling. In order to present the storage plant of Figure 2 as a graph 
with eight vertices, the edges of the graph need to be specified. In the context of cascading effect 
modeling, the escalation vectors (heat radiation in this study) form the edges of the graph. To 
calculate the intensity of escalation vectors, we use the freely accessible software ALOHA 
(Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) [37]. ALOHA [37] takes advantage of commonly-
used mathematical models such as Gaussian model and heavy gas dispersion model to present an 
accident scenario consequences under a variety of meteorological conditions (e.g., wind speed 
and direction, atmospheric stability class, air temperature and humidity), equipment 
specifications (e.g., equipment geometry, layout, and leakage diameter), and chemical substance 
characteristics (e.g., temperature, burning ratio, density, etc.). 
Assuming a wind speed of   measured at   above the ground and gusting from the 
South East, air temperature of  , relative humidity of , a partly cloudy sky, and stability 
class of , and a circular opening diameter of   for leakage, the heat radiation intensity 
received by f( from f', denoted by '(, are calculated by ALOHA [37] as tabulated in Table 3. 
Table 3. Heat radiation intensities () received by Tj from Ti 
&*
& & & & & & &$ &. &/
& 1 0#/ #0 0#/ # # #0 #
& #/ 1 0#/ / 0#/ # #/ #0
& #. #/ 1 #$. / 0#/  #/
& #/ / #/ 1 0#/ #0 0#/ #
& $ #/ / #/ 1 0#/ / 0#/
&$ #.$ $ #/ #. #/ 1 #$. /
&. #. #$.  #/ / #/ 1 0#/
&/ #.$ #. #$. $ #/ / #/ 1


 
Assuming     as the threshold value [25], the credible heat radiation intensities 
which are greater than the threshold value have been represented by solid edges in the graph of 
Figure 3.  
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To quantify the vertex metrics, we implemented the graph of Figure 3 in an open-source graph 
manipulation software igraph [38] which can be used as a dynamic library in the freely available 
statistical software R [39]. The centrality metrics for the vertices of the graph of Figure 3 have 
been calculated using igraph [38] and listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Vertex metrics for the graph shown in Figure 3. 
;		< =	"		 >		 ?				
& 1 1#1.0 1#11
&  1#11. 
&  1#1 1#
&  1#11. 
&   
&$  	
 1#11
&.  1#1 1#
&/  	
 1#11
 


As can be noted from Table 4, the tanks ,  , and ! have the largest degree and closeness 
centrality scores while , 	, and  have the largest betweenness scores. Thus, to identify the 
most critical initiating unit, individual BNs have been developed for , 	, , and   as 
primary units in Figure 4. It is worth noting that since escalation vectors with magnitudes lower 
than   are still likely to cause damage through synergistic effect [20], in this study the 
heat radiation intensities with magnitudes between ! and   have also been included in 
the BN model to account for possible synergistic effects. These heat radiations have been 
distinguished by dashed edges in Figure 4, implying they are not able to cause credible damage 
individually but together. Further, since the centrality scores of ! were exactly the same as of 
 , the BN of ! has not been displayed in Figure 4. In the BNs of Figure 4, primary, secondary, 
tertiary, and quaternary units have been highlighted gray, yellow, orange, and red, respectively. 
Further, those units that have been untouched during the cascading effect have been left 
uncolored. 
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As can be noted from Figure 4,  (4-b) and 	 (4-a) would not result in wide-spread cascading 
effects throughout the process plant. Hence, only BNs of  (4-c) and   (4-d) were considered 
and analyzed quantitatively to determine which unit would lead to a more severe cascading effect 
if selected as the primary unit. The BNs were modeled in the freely available software GeNIe 
[40], and the results were presented in Table 5. It is worth noting that the prior probability of 
pool fire in primary units has been considered as " [20]. Furthermore, conditional 
probabilities needed in BN modeling have been calculated by plugging the heat radiation 
$

intensities given in Table 3 into the probit function given in Table 1 for atmospheric storage 
tanks; then, the resulted probit values have been converted to probabilities using Equation 2 or 3.  
In order to compare the severity of cascading effects, their probabilities at consecutive levels 
have also been calculated using the BN methodology as shown in Table 5. For instance, 
according to the BN in which   is the primary unit (Figure 4-d), the probabilities of the first 
level # and second level # of the cascading effect is .  f g f7 g f  and  
.  f g f4 g f$, respectively. It should be noted these probabilities can readily be 
quantified by adding vertices # and # to the respective BNs and connecting them to the 
corresponding nodes by means of $%-gate conditional probability tables [20]. As can be seen 
from Table 5, aside from identical probabilities of # for the all the units as the primary unit,   
(or !) results in larger probabilities for # and # compared to .  
Table 5. Updated probabilities of events given a pool fire in primary event. 
 
;		< & &$ &/
& #13-1. #$3- #$3-
& #03-1 #13-1. /#3-1
& #03- #03-1 #13-
& #03-1 /#3-1 #13-1.
&  #03-1 #03-1
&$ $#03-.  #3-
&. #03- #13- #03-1
&/ $#03-. #3- 
= #//3-1 #//3-1 #//3-1
= $#13- 0#1/3-1 0#1/3-1
= #13-$ #13- #13-
 
Comparing the probability of cascading effects originated from the primary units ,  , and ! 
(Table 5) with the vertex metrics of the same units (Table 4), it can be implied that the primary 
unit (initiating unit) with the largest closeness score would result in the highest probabilities for 
cascading effects. This implication is in compliance with both the propagation mechanism of 
cascading effects and the physical interpretation of the closeness metric. That is, since a unit with 
a larger closeness score can reach to a larger number of other units (see the definition of 
closeness in Section 3.1), we can expect this unit to affect more number of units within a 
.

cascading effect. Thus, in order to prevent or reduce the probability of catastrophic cascading 
effects in process plants, units can be rank-ordered based on their closeness scores so that 
preventive measures can be allocated to the most critical primary units.  
Considering the vertex metrics in Table 4, more information about criticality of units can be 
elicited. Figures 5-a and 5-b depict the BNs developed for modeling cascading effects triggered 
by   and ! as the most critical initiating units (with largest closeness scores), respectively. It 
should be noted that Figure 5-a is the same as Figure 4-d and has been repeated here for the sake 
of further comparison. Figures 5-c and 5-d depict the same BNs in 5-a and 5-b, respectively, yet 
with the only difference that the nodes with largest betweenness scores, i.e., , 	, and , 
have been isolated (e.g., fireproofed) so that they cannot be entailed in the cascading effects 
triggered by   or !. These isolated units have been indicated in Figures 5-c and 5-d as double-
outlined nodes implying their higher resistance against heat radiations emitted from   or !.  
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As evidenced in Figure 5, having nodes with high betweenness protected by isolating them, 
significantly limits the propagation of a cascading effect through the process plant. Since 
betweenness is a metric to measure how much a node contributes to geodesic distances within a 
graph, exclusion of a node with large betweenness from a graph is very likely to disconnect the 
graph to a large extent. In the context of cascading effect analysis, however, exclusion of a node 
with high betweenness refers to the isolation of the node by means of fireproofing or other 
protective measures so that it cannot contribute to a potential cascading effect.  
5.2.Plant vulnerability analysis 
In this section, we will demonstrate the application of graph-level metrics to measure the plant 
vulnerability of a process plant in the context of cascading effects. For illustrative purposes, 
consider two common arrangements of chemical storage plants in Figure 6, which are rectangle 
(Figure 6-a) and triangle (Figure 6-b) layouts [41]. It has been further assumed that the tanks are 
of the same type and size as described in the storage plant of Figure 2 with the same 
environmental and operational conditions previously defined for ALOHA [37].  
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Heat radiation intensities were calculated for all pairs of units by ALOHA [37], and the resulting 
graphs were implemented in igraph [38] to quantify graph-level metrics. Table 6 presents the 
graph centrality measures, graph density  and average degree . As can be seen from Table 6, 
0

all the graph-level metrics of the triangle layout are less than those of the rectangle layout except 
the closeness centrality measure. Thus, to find out which layout would result in a higher 
probability for potential cascading effects, we model cascading effects within both layouts using 
BN. To model the potentially most devastating cascading effect in each layout, the vertex 
closeness metrics for the both graphs have been quantified as listed in Table 7 (columns 2 and 5) 
so that the most critical initiating (primary) unit in each graph could be identified. Consequently, 
  and  are identified as the most critical primary units in the rectangle (Figure 7-a) and 
triangle (Figure 7-b) layouts, respectively. The probabilities of pool fires in the other tanks as 
well as the probabilities of consecutive levels of cascading effects, i.e., #, #, #, and #	& are 
also presented in Table 7 (columns 4 and 7) given a pool fire in the corresponding primary units.  
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& 1#11 1#11 #03-1

1#11 1#11 #0/3-
& 1# #. #03-

1#11 1#11 0#13-
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As can be noted from the probabilities of #, #, #, and #	 in Table 7, the triangle layout 
could result in higher probabilities for the respective cascading effects. Considering the graph-
level metrics in Table 6, it can consequently be inferred that the graph with larger graph-level 
closeness score is more vulnerable to cascading effects. Having the graphs (BNs) in Figures 7-a 
and 7-b, the vertex-level betweenness scores have also been presented in Table 7 (columns 3 and 
6). Figures 7-c and 7-d display the same graphs in which the nodes with largest betweenness 
scores have been double-outlined, implying their isolation can significantly limit the propagation 
of a potential cascading effect within the process plant.  

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5.3.Discussion 
In the previous sections, we demonstrated that certain graph theory metrics can effectively be 
used as a quick and reliable tool in the vulnerable analysis of process plants. Although BN has 
proved to be a versatile methodology for both risk analysis [20] and vulnerability analysis of 
chemical plants (this study), the application of such graph metrics as a complementary tool could 
increase the efficacy of modeling and significantly reduce the time of analysis. For example, 
regarding the application of BN to unit vulnerability analysis, in the absence of vertex-level 
closeness metric to identify the most critical primary unit, individual BNs should be developed 
for each unit of the process plant as the primary unit to determine which unit would result in a 
more severe cascading effect. The analysis would become even more cumbersome and time-
consuming in the case of plant vulnerability analysis where the above-mentioned individual BNs 
should be developed and analyzed for each process plant layout separately. 
However, it should be noted that the identification of critical units and layouts using graph theory 
metrics in this study has been under the influence of a variety of topological, meteorological, and 
operational factors the change of which could result in a different set of critical units and layouts. 
For example, consider the process plant of Figure 2 with a wind direction from north instead of 
south-east. Figure 8-a depicts a graph representation of the process plant, where the arcs 
represent the heat radiation intensities greater than the threshold value    . Having 
the graph of Figure 8-a implemented in igraph [38], the vertex-level closeness and betweenness 
scores have been calculated and listed in Table 8. As can be seen from the table, the unit 	 has 
the largest closeness score while , , and  have the largest betweenness scores. 
Considering 	 as the primary unit, the corresponding BN for modeling the potential cascading 
effect has been developed in Figure 8-b, in which heat radiation intensities lower than the 
threshold value have been also included to account for possible synergistic effects (dashed arcs). 
Figure 8-c depicts the same BN in which , , and  have also been isolated from the 
cascading effect, indicated as double-outlined nodes. As evident from this example, with a 
change in wind direction, a different set of critical units have been identified using the graph 
metrics. As a result, it is advised that the parameters used in ALOHA [37] to calculate the 
escalation vectors (e.g., wind speed and direction) represent the predominant characteristics of 
the process plant under consideration.  
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Table 8. Vertex metrics for the graph shown in Figure 8-a.  
;		< >		 ?				
& 1#01 
& 1#1.. 
& 1#11$ 1#11
& 	 1#11
& 1#1/ 	
&$ 1#11$ 1#11
&. 1#$11 1#1
&/ 1#1$ 1#11
 
In the present study we showed that certain graph metrics such as closeness and betweenness 
scores can effectively be used for both unit and plant vulnerability analysis while considering the 
heat radiation as the only escalation vector in cascading effects. However, to establish these 
graph metrics as a reliable tool in the identification of critical units and layouts in process plants 
a broader range of process units (e.g., pressurized equipment), accident scenarios (e.g., 


explosions), and escalation vectors (e.g., overpressure) should be taken into account in future 
work.  
6. Conclusions 
This work has illustrated an application of graph theory to vulnerability analysis of process 
plants subject to cascading effects. We examined the applicability of a number of graph metrics 
to both (i) unit and (ii) plant vulnerability analysis of chemical storage plants. In the unit 
vulnerability analysis, we applied a number of vertex-level metrics such as degree, closeness, 
and betweenness to identify the most critical primary and intermediate units within a process 
plant. In the plant vulnerability analysis, however, a set of graph-level metrics such as graph 
degree, graph closeness, graph betweenness, graph density, and graph average degree were 
applied to identify the most vulnerable layout which would lead to higher probabilities for a 
potential cascading effect. The results obtained from graph metrics were compared and verified 
using a Bayesian network methodology.  
We showed that in the unit vulnerability analysis, a primary unit with the largest vertex-level 
closeness score would result in a higher likelihood and severity for a potential cascading effect 
compared to its peers in the same process plant. Furthermore, units with relatively larger 
betweenness values would contribute more than other units to the propagation of a previously 
started cascading effect. From a plant vulnerability viewpoint, it was demonstrated that for a 
process plant, a layout (units’ arrangement) with relatively larger graph-level closeness score 
would be more vulnerable to the escalation of cascading effects – in terms of probability and 
severity – compared to other available layouts for the same process plant.  
This study demonstrated that certain graph metrics can effectively be used for a quick and 
preliminary screening of either vulnerable units or vulnerable layouts in process plants. These 
vulnerable units and layouts can further be investigated in more detail using available methods 
such as Bayesian Network analysis.  
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